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REAL PROPERTY
Lawrence J. Fossi, *
Bryant W Burke,**
Philip D. Weller***
IKE the Ice Age advance of glaciers, the slow but inexorable codifica-
tion of real estate law scraped forward this Survey period. That vast
statutory slab called the Texas Property Code again expanded with
the passage of legislation that limits a mortgagee's deficiency rights upon
foreclosure. In the process, the ever-shrinking terrain of the courts as com-
mon law adjudicators was further ground down and crushed under.
It remains to be seen, though, whether this latest legislative encroachment
will survive judicial review. Earlier this century, the Texas supreme court
struck down similar legislation as violative of the Texas Constitution's con-
tract clause.I This time, however, it seemed that the lawmakers would steer
clear of constitutional proscriptions. The drafting of HB 169 was guided by
scholarly analysis and honed by competing interest groups, and the final
product appeared both coherent and constitutionally sound.
Alas, after the bill's passage the lawmakers were not content to rest on
their considerable achievement. While the lenders' lobbyists were returning
home with the contented sense of having fought to a satisfactory draw, the
borrowers' lobby was hard at work concocting a second bill and pushing it
through to passage. This second bill, while touted as a helpful supplement to
the first, may actually render them both unconstitutional.
This Survey period saw other notable events, including an assignment of
rents case that may revolutionize the field, 2 a rare affirmation of the sanctity
of contract,3 an intriguing study of the collision between real property and
personal property foreclosure law,4 and a host of significant decisions about
leasing, condemnation, brokers, and homestead.
' B.A., Rice University; J.D., Yale Law School. Partner, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.,
Dallas
•* B.A., Colgate University, J.D., University of Texas School of Law. Associate, Vinson
& Elkins L.L.P., Dallas
*** B.A., Bowling Green State University, J.D., University of Houston. Partner, Vinson
& Elkins L.L.P., Dallas
1. Langever v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 1025 (Tex. 1934).
2. Georgetown Assocs., Ltd. v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.)
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A. The New Deficiency-Limiting Legislation
After several false starts over the past few years, the Texas legislature
passed some sweeping and important legislation regarding deficiency judg-
ments that arise out of real property foreclosures. The legislation, enacted in
April and June of 1991 as HB 169 and HB 2825, adds sections 51.003,
51.004, and 51.005 to the Texas Property Code.5
The most carefully considered and thoroughly debated measure is HB
169, which is codified as Section 51.003. It applies to non-judicial foreclo-
sures, and contains the following key provisions:
The mortgagee in any non-judicial foreclosure sale must institute any ac-
tion to collect a deficiency within two years after the foreclosure.
"Any person" against whom such a collection is sought (including, pre-
sumably, both the mortgagor and any guarantor) may request that a court
determine the fair market value of the foreclosed property as of the date of
the foreclosure sale.
Both the mortgagor and mortgagee are allowed to introduce evidence of
fair market value for consideration by the fact finder. That evidence may
include, but is not limited to, expert opinions, comparable sales data, evi-
dence concerning the anticipated marketing time and holding costs, evidence
of the cost of sale, and evidence about the "necessity and amount of any
discount to be applied to the future sales price or the cash flow generated by
the property to arrive at a current fair market value."
If the fact finder determines that the property's fair market value exceeds
its sales price, then the excess must be deducted from the deficiency amount.
Failing a request for a determination of fair market value, or failing the
introduction of competent evidence in proceedings to arrive at such a deter-
mination, the foreclosure sales price shall be used to compute the deficiency.
The mortgagee shall credit the debtor with proceeds from private mort-
gage insurance; however, such required crediting shall not impair the in-
surer's right to proceed against the debtor or any other liable party by way of
subrogation. 6
The legislation changes the prior law in two significant ways. First, the
four-year statute of limitations on deficiency actions is shortened to two
years.7 Second, and most importantly, the legislation displaces the judge-
made rule that, absent a procedural defect in the foreclosure sale, the
amount of proceeds received at the sale must be "grossly inadequate" before
the court will prohibit that amount from being used in calculating a
deficiency.8
5. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 51.003-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
6. Id. §51.003.
7. Id. §§ 51.003-.005.
8. For guidance on how inadequate sales proceeds must be in order to be regarded as
"grossly inadequate," see FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1990) (generally, a
sales price of more than 62.3% of market value is not grossly inadequate); Georgetown Assocs.
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The most intriguing part of the legislation is the provision that outlines
the types of evidence that may be considered in determining fair market
value. The phrase fair market value is rarely elucidated in foreclosure stat-
utes or decisional law, so the Texas law is praiseworthy in its effort to give
the phrase some meaningful content. To say that the statute has the begin-
nings of a fair market value definition, however, does not suggest that the
definition is comprehensive. Many questions remain to be answered by the
decisional law as it develops, includifng whether parties can modify or sup-
plement the statute's fair market value definition in their loan documents
and whether the allowed consideration of marketing time and holding costs
will justify a discount over a value amount arrived at by comparable sales
data.
Despite the inevitable areas of uncertainty, the legislation is well-drafted
and balanced. It creates clear and specific procedures, and it gives the mort-
gagor protection against inordinately low bids that sometimes occur at fore-
closure sales, 9 while also taking into account the high holding costs and thin
markets that plague many mortgagees after foreclosure. The balance in the
legislation is no accident. Drafts of the statute were intensively studied and
debated by lobbyists on both sides of the question. The statute's passage was
assured only after the lending interests had purged several open-ended provi-
sions from the first draft.
One of the drafters' major concerns was the constitutionality of the stat-
ute. As Jim Wallenstein has pointed out in a thoughtful speech,10 the new
legislation is remarkably similar to the Anti-Deficiency Judgment Law that
was passed by the Texas legislature in 1933.11 A year later, however, the
Texa supreme court struck down the 1933 enactment as violative of the
Texas Constitution's contract clause. 12 The court found the statute defective
because it purported to impair existing contract rights.1 3
At the time of HB 169's passage, there were several reasons to believe
that, standing alone, the new section 51.003 would not suffer a fate similar to
v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (a sales price of 74% of market value is not grossly inadequate).
9. Olney Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v. Farmers Market of Odessa, 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied) (an egregious example of a lender acquiring property with a
lowball foreclosure bid, selling it at a much higher price, then pursuing a deficiency action
against the borrower based on the lowball bid price).
10. Jim Wallenstein, "Statutory Update: Judicial and Non-Judicial Foreclosures,"
Presented to the SMU Continuing Legal Education Program, Dallas, Texas, January 24, 1992
11. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2218 (Vernon 1925), amended by Act of April 21,
1933, 43rd Leg. R.S., ch. 92, 1933 Tex. Gen. Laws 198 (the 1933 legislation amended then
article 2218 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes to provide that the defendant in a post-foreclo-
sure deficiency suit "may plead as a defense or partial defense to such suit or against such
deficiency judgment that said property at such foreclosure was sold for less than its actual
value . . . ." Upon so pleading, the defendant was entitled to have his deficiency judgment
reduced by the excess of the property's "actual value" over the foreclosure bid price. See
Langever v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 1025 at 1027 (Tex. 1934)).
12. Langever v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 1025, 1028 (Tex. 1934).
13. Id. at 1029. (Art. I, Section 16, of the Texas Constitution provides: "No bill of attain-




that of the 1933 enactment. First, since the New Deal courts have tended,
for better or for worse, to take a more lenient view of the constitutional
prohibition of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Also, in 1937 the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. 14 upheld the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute
that was quite similar to the one struck down by the Texas high court in
1933. In Richmond Mortgage, the Court found that rather than impairing a
contractual obligation, the law at issue "merely restricted the exercise of the
contractual remedy .... -15 In interpreting the Texas Constitution, of
course, Texas courts are not bound by the manner in which the U.S.
Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution. Still, Richmond suggests
why section 51.003 should not suffer the fate of its 1933 predecessor. Like
the statute at issue in Richmond, section 51.003 does not preclude a mortga-
gee from using a judicial foreclosure proceeding, and thereby escaping the
judicial fair market value determination. 16 Hence, the new law does not im-
pair the mortgagor's obligation; rather, it merely limits the mortgagee's
remedy. ' 7
Alas, as soon as the mortgage lending lobbyists had headed home, the
legislators concocted HB 2825, which contains two additional, and ill-ad-
vised, statutory provisions. The first, codified as section 51.004 of the Texas
Property Code, applies to judicial foreclosure sales.' 8 It is otherwise identi-
cal to section 51.003 except that it (i) substitutes a 90-day statute of limita-
tions for section 51.003's two-year limitations period, and (ii) tolls the
statute for a guarantor who had no notice of the judicial foreclosure
proceedings. 19
The second provision, codified at section 51.005 of the Property Code, is
designed to protect guarantors in instances where the mortgagee first sues
the guarantor and then institutes foreclosure proceedings. 20 Section 51.005
allows a guarantor to bring an action of his own provided that it is brought
within 90 days after the foreclosure sale date or, if he is unaware of the sale,
within 90 days after he learns of it.21
The two patchwork provisions present some troublesome questions. The
most obvious problem is that by subjecting a judicial foreclosure proceeding
to the fair market value determination rule, the legislature has undercut the
basis for distinguishing section 51.003 from its doomed 1933 predecessor.
14. 300 U.S. 124 (1937).
15. Id. at 131.
16. TEX PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
17. See Mixon, Deficiency Judgments Following Home Mortgage Foreclosures: An Anach-
ronism That Increases Personal Tragedy, Impedes Regional Economic Recovery, and Means
Little to Lenders, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 58-66 (1991) (where precisely this distinction led
one commentator to conclude that, in order to pass constitutional muster, any deficiency-
limiting legislation should "preserve existing note holders' substantive right to deficiency after
judicial foreclosure" (emphasis in original)).
18. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.004 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1992).
19. Id.




Hence, section 51.003 is vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. Also, some
of the guarantor provisions of section 51.005 are just so much jabberwocky.
For example, a guarantor is empowered to bring an action only after four
conditions have occurred. One such condition is that the holder of the mort-
gage debt has obtained a judgment against the guarantor. 22 What happens if
the debt holder waits 90 days before instituting any such action? Assuming
the guarantor had notice of the foreclosure sale, the guarantor is trapped.
He can't bring an action until the holder has a judgment, yet he also can't
bring an action after the judgment if it is entered more than 90 days after the
foreclosure sale.
Besides being poorly conceived, section 51.005 is just plain unnecessary.
As a "person against whom... "recovery is sought, ' 23 the guarantor may
proceed under section 51.003 in much the same way as the primary obligor.
Taken as a whole, the new legislation promises eventually to become a
solid framework for foreclosure law. For now, however, the two last-minute
additions of sections 51.004 and 51.005 make the whole enterprise question-
able, and will likely invite challenges to the entire statutory scheme's
constitutionality.
B. Foreclosures and Deficiency Judgments Under the Pre-April 1991 Law
The setting of the sun on the days when the common law governed large
expanses in the territory of private foreclosure did not occur without a final
flourish. Two cases, Georgetown Associates, Ltd. v. Home Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n 24 and Pentad Joint Venture v. First National Bank of
LaGrange,25 featured many of the issues that have animated the courts dur-
ing the past few years and that will continue to be joined in litigation arising
out of mortgages made before April of 1991.
Georgetown Associates saw a feisty 14th District court of appeals slam the
door on yet another claim by borrowers that the proceeds from a private
foreclosure sale were grossly inadequate, and hence precluded a deficiency
judgment. 26 In support of their view that a gross disparity in market value
over foreclosure price creates a jury issue, even despite the absence of a pro-
cedural irregularity in the sale, the borrowers relied on a familiar trio of
cases: Olney Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers' Market of Odessa, Inc.,27
Halter v. Allied Merchant's Bank,28 and Lee v. Sabine Bank.29 The appeals
court did not merely distinguish those cases; it demolished them. Ge-
orgetown Associates concludes that Olney has no precedential value because
22. Id.
23. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.0005 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
24. 795 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
25. 797 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
26. Georgetown Assocs., 795 S.W.2d at, 255 (see Lawrence J. Fossi, et al., Real Property
Annual Survey of Texas Law 2, 45 Sw. L.J. 595 (1991); Lawrence J. Fossi, et al., Real Property
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 249, 251 (1990)).
27. 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1989, no writ).
28. 751 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
29. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Olney's lead opinion actually garnered no support from the other two judges,
one of whom wrote a concurring opinion that relied on the contrary author-
ity of American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Musick,30 and the other of whom
merely joined in the result.3' Thus, Olney is a headnote rather than a
holding.32
Halter, decided by the Beaumont court of appeals, relies on Lee, decided
by the same court two years earlier. 33 Lee, however, was absolutely unsup-
ported by Texas law. Instead, Lee reached its result by analogizing a real
property foreclosure with a repossession under the federal Ship Mortgage
Act.34 "Admiralty law in hand," said the Georgetown Associates court in a
particularly biting passage, "the [Lee] court rolls out the ultimate authority:
an article in 39 Tex.Jur.2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds."135 The Lee holding
that a borrower may contest any sale in which there exists a probable dispar-
ity between sales price and fair market value is mere "dictum when applied
to anything on dry land. .. 36 While not a model of courteous regard for
the work of its sister courts, the Georgetown Associates decision does have the
rare virtues of pithiness and liveliness.
Citing English v. Fischer37 and FDIC v. Coleman,38 the court of appeals in
Georgetown Associates also disposed of a claim that the lender owed a duty of
good faith and fair dealing to the obligors.3 9 Further, the appeals court de-
cided that where some loan documents indicated that California law would
govern, while others - including the guaranty at issue - selected Texas,
Texas law was applicable for two reasons. First, the document in question
stated that Texas law would govern. Second, the transaction's contacts with
Texas would make the laws of Texas applicable in default of any selection by
the parties, and the conflicting choice-of-law provisions in the documents
was tantamount to a failure to select a particular forum's law.4° Addition-
ally, the court held that a dispute over the deficiency resulting from foreclo-
sure would not bar execution on a guarantee for up to $500,000 where it was
clear that, in all events, the deficiency exceeded that amount.4 ' Finally, the
court was required to determine whether the borrower was personally liable
for taxes paid by the lender. The loan documents stated that the lender
could pay such taxes "at [b]orrower's expense" if borrower failed to do so,
but those documents also stated that foreclosure was the lender's only rem-
edy in the event of default. The court acknowledged it was a close question,
30. 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975) (holding that mere inadequacy of price will not
invalidate a foreclosure sale absent evidence of some irregularity which "caused or contributed
to cause the property to be sold for a grossly inadequate price").
31. Georgetown Assocs., 795 S.W.2d at 254.
32. Id.
33. 751 S.W.2d 286, 287-88.
34. Id.
35. Georgetown Assocs., 795 S.W.2d at 255.
36. Id.
37. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
38, 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
39. 795 S.W.2d at 254.
40. Id. at 253-54.
41. Id. at 254.
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but held the borrower not personally liable for the taxes paid by the lender.42
Pentad Joint Venture has a result that is somewhat more perplexing. Like
the Georgetown Associates decision, Pentad Joint Venture made quick work
of a borrower's affirmative defense to a deficiency action based on a claimed
inadequacy of foreclosure sales price in comparison with fair market value.43
Further, the Pentad decision swiftly disposed of claims that a mortgagee has
a duty to conduct a foreclosure sale in a manner calculated to maximize the
sales price, 44 and that the foreclosure sale was not commercially reason-
able. 45 However, the appeals court reversed the trial court's summary judg-
ment dismissal of the obligors' counterclaims based on breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, common law fraud, and unconscionability under
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.46 The appeals court based its re-
versal on the lack of conclusive evidence of the property's fair market value.
Such evidence, said the court, was required to support the bank's summary
judgment assertion that by bidding 70% of the property's fair market value,
it had precluded the counterclaims. 47 Further, under the doctrine enunci-
ated in Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring,48 the obligors were enti-
tled to an opportunity to amend their pleadings. In light of the remainder of
the holding, it is unclear why the counterclaim based on a duty of good faith
and fair dealing was not also ripe for summary dismissal.
C. Assignment of Rents
The most important case of this Survey period will surely be FDIC v. In-
ternational Property Management, Inc. 49 if only it manages to take root in
assignment of rents jurisprudence. The International Property Management
decision, in its crisp analysis and clear holding, is a breath of fresh air in an
area of law that, for the past decade, has been impenetrably dense, thanks in
large part to the Texas supreme court's thoroughly inscrutable work in Tay-
lor v. Brennan.50 Taylor held out the theoretical possibility that an assign-
ment of rents could be absolute in character, in which case the assignor
would be entitled to rents from the date of the default.5' Taylor also, how-
42. Id. at 256.
43. Pentad, 797 S.W.2d at 95-96 (citing, American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531,
S.W.2d 581 587 (Tex. 1975); Greater Southwest Office Park, Ltd. v. Texas Commerce Bank,
N.A., 786 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
44. Id. at 97 (citing Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.
1965). The Pentad court would surely have also cited FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706
(Tex. 1990), but the supreme court case was handed down on the same day as the Pentad
decision, and hence not available to the court of appeals).
45. Id. (citing Huddleston v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, N.A., 756 S.W.2d 343, 347
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (lender has no duty to conduct a commercially reason-
able real estate foreclosure sale). Again, FDIC V Coleman would also have been an apt cita-
tion had it been available to the appeals court.
46. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
47. Pentad, 797 S.W.2d at 97-98 (the court noted that the bank's theory appeared to be
that, as a matter of law, 70% of value is not grossly inadequate).
48. 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1984).
49. 929 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1991).
50. 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
51. Id. at 594-95.
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ever, strongly suggested that any assignment of rents which secured payment
of debt (and, as far as the real estate attorney is concerned, they all do) was
collateral in nature,5 2 and thereby precluded a mortgagee from obtaining the
rental revenues until he either obtained possession of the property, im-
pounded the rents, secured the appointment of a receiver, or took some simi-
lar action,5 3 whatever that might mean. The Fifth Circuit in International
Property Management noted that the Taylor court could have recognized
that all assignments in connection with a mortgage are made to secure the
mortgage debt. Such a recognition, said the Fifth Circuit, would likely have
led the Taylor court to adopt one of two approaches. First, it could have
followed the common law rule and required the mortgagee always to take
some step to perfect its interest in rents following default. Second, "it could
have decided that it would not follow the common law rule when the parties
sufficiently evidence their intent that the right to rents should pass automati-
cally upon default."'54 Instead, however, the Taylor court "adopted neither
of these straightforward alternatives," but rather resorted to a highly artifi-
cial distinction between title transfers and security interests. 5"
In case after case since Taylor, rental assignments have invariably been
found to be collateral in nature, notwithstanding express language reciting
that they were intended to be absolute. 56 International Property Manage-
ment finally snaps the skein. In finding that the assignment of rents clause
created an absolute assignment, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the following
factors: (i) the assignment at issue provided that it "is intended to be abso-
lute, unconditional, and presently effective," (ii) the assignment did not re-
quire any affirmative action by the mortgagee to secure the rents, (iii) the
same provision in the assignment which allowed the mortgagee to collect
rents directly from lessees following a default also stated that such provision
was intended solely for the benefit of each lessee and would not inure to the
benefit of the assignor, (iv) the assignment was not contingent upon notice
to the lessees, (v) rents paid to the mortgagor prior to notice of the lessees
were, by the terms of the assignment, deemed held in trust for the benefit of
the mortgagee, and (vi) the assignment stated that the assignor need never
institute legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the assignment.57
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the assignment at issue was, in some
sense, collateral in nature because it (a) allowed the mortgagor to receive
rents until default, (b) required the mortgagee to apply rental income to the
debt, with any remainder going to the mortgagor, and (c) provided for its
own termination on release of a related deed of trust.5 8 The Fifth Circuit
noted, however, that Taylor states that the Texas supreme court will give
52. Id.
53. Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 574.
54. Int'l Property, 929 F.2d at 1035.
55. Id.
56. See NCNB Tex. Nat'i Bank v. Sterling Projects, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).




effect to an absolute assignment of rents if the parties' intent to create such
an assignment is sufficiently clear. 59 In this case, the language "could hardly
be clearer." 6°
Another noteworthy assignment of rents case is Treetop Apartments Gen-
eral Partnership v. Oyster.6 1 In Treetop the foreclosure purchaser of an
apartment complex sued for the post-foreclosure rents collected by the de-
faulting former owner. The foreclosure sale had occurred on the first Tues-
day of the month, by which time the former owner had pocketed most of the
month's rentals. The Treetop court refused to require disgorgement by the
former owner, reasoning that his collection of the rents had severed them
from the real property, and therefore the purchaser had acquired no interest
in them.62 The purchaser's argument that its ratification of the leases enti-
tled it to the rents notwithstanding any severance was unavailing because,
according to the court, the foreclosure sale voided the junior leases. There-
fore, the ratification was effective only between the purchaser and the ten-
ants.63 The general applicability of the Treetop holding may be limited
because the deed of trust at issue did not empower the trustee to convey any
rights in rentals.64
D. Prepayment Premiums
In Texas, "[t]here is perhaps, no higher public policy of the state than to
uphold contracts validly entered into and legally permissible in subject mat-
ter."'65 Texas courts actually used to say such quaint-sounding things; the
quote is from a 1951 court of appeals decision. 66 Even if it is doubtful
whether contracts still enjoy their wholly sacred 67 nature in state courts, a
federal court decision, Parker Plaza West Partners v. Unum Pension & In-
surance Co.,68 shows that some judges still believe that a deal's a deal. At
issue in Parker Plaza was a prepayment clause which required payment of a
stiff prepayment premium equal to the greater of (i) 10% of the amount
prepaid and (ii) an amount which when invested in U.S. government obliga-
tions would enable the noteholder to maintain its healthy 16% yield on the
promissory note. The borrower defaulted by failing to pay $1,900 of late fees
and by becoming delinquent in the payment of property taxes, thus prompt-
ing an acceleration of the $2.77-million outstanding in principal. The note-
holder drew down on a letter of credit not only for the full principal amount
outstanding plus about $45,000 in interest and late fees, but also an addi-
tional $947,731 as a prepayment premium. The maker urged that the pre-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 800 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
62. Id. at 629.
63. Id. at 630.
64. Id. at 629.
65. Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. Conway, 240 S.W.2d 796, 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1951, writ ref'd).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 941 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1991).
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payment premium was an unenforceable penalty under Texas law. The trial
court granted summary judgment in the maker's favor, prompting the ap-
peal to the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit stated that Texas law has never squarely addressed
whether a prepayment premium is enforceable if it arises upon acceleration
by the lender, rather than upon voluntary prepayment by the borrower. 69
As foundation principles, the court noted that, absent a contrary contractual
provision, Texas law does not accord a borrower the right to prepay. 70 Fur-
ther, a prepayment premium is not interest for purposes of usury law so long
as the premium, when spread out over the note's maturity, does not exceed
the legal rate. 7 1 The rationale for prohibiting prepayment is that the bor-
rower can avoid the premium by paying the note according to its terms.7 2
The Fifth Circuit made a careful review of pertinent Texas authority and
concluded that, under the applicable precedent, prepayment premiums are
barred as penalties only where the loan documents do not expressly permit
them.73 For example, a challenge to a prepayment premium was upheld in
North Point Patio Ventures v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co. ,74 In North
Point the lender sought to extract a premium from the borrower based on a
due on sale clause. The North Point court would not allow the lender to
collect the premium because the agreement at issue contained no provision
allowing it, and because to permit its collection would constitute an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation.75 The Fifth Circuit determined that a pre-
payment premium was permissible where the loan documents expressly
provided that one could be collected upon default by the borrower and accel-
eration by the lender. The court relied both on the inferential support of
North Point and similar cases, and also on the more direct support of Meisler
v. Republic of Texas Savings Ass'n.76 Meisler permitted collection of a pre-
mium upon borrower default, but was fuzzed-up somewhat by language in
the loan documents stipulating that a tender by the borrower upon default
and acceleration would be considered to be a voluntary prepayment.7 7 Not-
ing that Meisler and the famous Sonny Arnold7 8 decision both supported the
proposition that acceleration clauses serve a valid business purpose, the Fifth
Circuit found no public policy that justified interference with the plain con-
tractual intent, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 79
69. Id. at 352.
70. Id. (citing Ware v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 604 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
71. Id. (citing Bearden v. Tarrant Say. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
72. See Boyd v. Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest, 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd).
73. 941 F.2d at 352.
74. 672 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. Id. at 38.
76. 758 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
77. Id. at 884.
78. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).




Guaranty agreements commonly contain limitation provisions which re-
strict the amount guaranteed to only a certain portion of the debt, such as
the top 20% of the debt. Such provisions became particularly fashionable in
the late 1970s, and the subsequent hard times in the Texas real estate market
have produced several cases interpreting those provisions. Frailty being the
human condition, it appears that many of the partial liability provisions were
imprecisely drafted. A common shortcoming is a failure to address how pro-
ceeds received by a lender in foreclosure proceedings are to be applied in
determining the dollar amount of liability under the guaranty.
University Savings Association v. Miller 80 is a textbook example of an im-
precise partial liability provision. An individual guaranteed the corporate
borrower's obligation under a $2,740,000 mortgage note "to the extent of the
first or top ten (10%) of all sums owing and to be owing upon the Note." '
The note was also secured by a deed of trust. When the borrower defaulted,
the lender made demand on the guarantor for 10% of the total outstanding
indebtedness, which stood at more than $3-million. The guarantor refused
to pay and the lender went ahead with a foreclosure sale which fetched
$2,400,000, leaving an unpaid balance of approximately $627,000. The
lender sought to collect approximately $300,000, being 10% of the amount
owed under the note at the time of foreclosure. The guarantor persuaded the
trial court that his liability had been extinguished because the foreclosure
sale proceeds were greater than 10% of the original note balance.
In reversing, the appeals court relied on language in the guaranty agree-
ment stipulating that the lender need not exhaust its remedies against the
borrower or foreclose its liens before proceeding against the guarantor.8 2 It
relied also on language giving the lender discretion in exercising remedies
under collateral agreements and stating that any exercise or refrain from
exercise of such remedies would "in no wise impair or diminish the obliga-
tions of [the guarantor]. '8 3 Most importantly, the guaranty allowed the
lender to apply the security to the unguaranteed portion of the debt before
applying it to the guaranteed portion.
A second example, decided only months after Miller, is Preston Ridge Fi-
nancial Services Corp. v. Tyler.84 The guarantor promised to pay when due
the amount by which the total principal outstanding under the note ex-
ceeded $735,000. At the time of default, the principal outstanding was ap-
proximately $1.1-million. The lender foreclosed its liens, collected $735,000
at the foreclosure sale, and sought to recover the deficiency from the guaran-
tor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the guarantor,
who contended that the foreclosure sale extinguished his liability under the
guaranty by reducing the outstanding principal to below $735,000. In a
80. 786 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
81. Id. at 462.
82. Id. at 463.
83. Id.
84. 796 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
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rambling opinion, the appeals court reversed.8 5 Focusing on a recitation to
the effect that the guaranty was made to induce the lender to make the loan
evidenced by a note and secured by a deed of trust, the court found clear
proof that the lender's purpose in obtaining the guaranty was to supplement
the security afforded by the deed of trust.8 6 Additionally, the appeals court
interpreted the "when due" language to mean that the liability of the guar-
antor was determined at the moment of the maker's default.8 7
In Dann v. Teambank 8 8 the corporate borrower executed a note and deed
of trust in the principal amount of $550,000. The president of the corpora-
tion signed a separate guaranty agreement. Beneath her handwritten signa-




After a default by and foreclosure against the corporation, the lender sued
the guarantor for the deficiency. The guarantor defended by contending that
she was not liable in her individual capacity under the guaranty. The court
noted that a written collateral undertaking given to secure a corporate debt
would be rendered meaningless if the primary debtor was also the sole guar-
antor.89 Consequently, it said that corporate designations appearing after
the signatures of guaranties of this type are considered to be only descriptio
personae; that is, the use of a word or phrase merely to identify the person
intended and not as an intimation that the language applies to that person
only in the technical character which might appear to be indicated by the
word.90 The court relied heavily on American Petrofina Co. v. Bryan 9 1 in
defending its holding.92 The court noted that the language of the guaranty
made a distinction between the guarantor and borrower, and that clearly
they were intended to be different persons. 93
Waite v. BancTexas-Houston94 involved loans to a partnership whose
partners included four individuals, each of whom signed guaranties. The
note signed by the partnership contained a provision stating that the payee's
only remedy against the maker or its partners in the event of a default would
be to foreclose on a deed of trust given to secure the note. The note addi-
tionally stated that none of its provisions affected the payee's rights under
the terms of any separate guaranty agreements relating to the note's pay-
85. Id. at 774.
86. Id. at 777-78.
87. Id. at 778-79.
88. 788 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
89. Id. at 184.
90. Id.
91. 519 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
92. Dann, 788 S.W.2d at 184-85. The court also rejected a contention by the guarantor
that § 3.403 of the UCC was applicable. That section provides that if a negotiable instrument
is signed in a representative capacity, then the signatory is not personally obligated; rather, the
obligation belongs to the person represented. The court noted that a guaranty is not a negotia-
ble instrument, and declined to extend the application of § 3.403 to guaranties. Id. at 186.
93. Id. at 184-85.
94. 792 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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ment. Thus, the note relieved the partners from personal liability, but re-
ferred to guaranty agreements that made those partners personally liable.
The court acknowledged that the language in the note could be considered
confusing, but said it was not ambiguous insofar as it pertained to the part-
ners' liability as guarantors.95
It is gratifying for a draftsman to see that some of the standard stock
provisions he invariably includes in guaranty agreements will actually be
given effect by the courts. Martin v. First Republic Bank, Fort Worth 96 pro-
vides this pleasant feedback. The case arose out of the standard guaranty
agreement scenario: a suit by a bank against guarantors after default by the
primary obligor under a mortgage note. In defending against a summary
judgment motion, the guarantors asserted that a question of fact existed re-
garding whether the lender could sue on the guaranties before a deficiency
was established by foreclosure under the deed of trust. The court disagreed,
and quoted the guaranty agreement language stating that, "it shall not be
necessary for Bank, in order to enforce such payment by Guarantor, first, to
institute suit or exhaust its remedies against Borrower or others liable on
such indebtedness, or to enforce its rights against any security which shall
ever have been given to secure such indebtedness."' 97 That language meant
what it said, said the court, and was perfectly enforceable. 98
F. Other Mortgage Decisions
Fairfield Financial Group, Inc. v. Gawerc 99 illustrates the dangers run by a
mortgagee who chronically accepts payments that are too small or too late.
In Fairfield the mortgagor obtained an injunction blocking a foreclosure
based on his assertion that, by accepting a series of non-conforming pay-
ments, the mortgagee had waived its right to insist on payment in accord-
ance with the loan documents. The appeals court, in sustaining the
injunction, pointed to a lack of evidence suggesting that the mortgagee ever
protested the mortgagor's irregular payments.1°° Under such circum-
stances, said the appeals court, the indulgent creditor may not thereafter
insist on immediate adherence to the loan documents; rather, the creditor
must first give the delinquent obligor a sufficient opportunity for redemp-
tion.10 1 The mortgagee contended that the indulgent creditor had no such
duty after the note's final maturity date,'0 2 but the appeals court held that
the duty continued where, as here, the mortgagee continued to accept non-
conforming payments after the maturity date.10 3 Finally, the mortgagee
95. Id. at 541.
96. 799 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
97. Id. at 486.
98. Id.
99. 814 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
100. Id. at 208.
101. Id. at 209 (citing Hill v. James, 7 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. Civ. App--Eastland 1928, no
writ)).
102. Id. (citing U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bimco Iron & Metal Corp., 464 S.W.2d
353, 357 (Tex. 1971)).
103. Id.
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contended that, assuming there was a duty to afford the obligor a sufficient
opportunity for redemption, the amount of time between the note's maturity
date and the foreclosure sale constituted such an opportunity. °4 The ap-
peals court again disagreed. Once the waiver occurred, said the court, it
devolved on the mortgagee to take some affirmative action to enforce the
obligation; the mortgagee could not simply lay behind the log and capitalize
on the obligor's inaction.105
Randle v. NCNB Texas National Bank 10 6 illustrates that courts are taking
a more skeptical look at lender liability claims. In Randle the borrowers had
conveyed portions of the land pursuant to contracts for deed that were made
subject to their mortgage. The mortgage loan went into default, discussions
commenced, a foreclosure eventually occurred, and the bank sought to col-
lect a deficiency judgment. The borrowers defended by contending that, on
the eve of the foreclosure, the bank had made oral representations indicating
that the parties had reached an agreed loan workout. Therefore, the borrow-
ers claimed that pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the bank
was barred from foreclosing. The trial court entered judgment for the bank.
The appeals court was similarly unimpressed with the borrowers' plea. The
appeals court pointed out that the borrowers' evidence consisted largely of
affidavits to the effect that the borrowers had assured their contract purchas-
ers that matters would be resolved with the bank, and that the borrowers
feared lawsuits from the contract purchasers as the result of the foreclo-
sure. '0 7 Even if all this were true, said the appeals court, there was no claim
or evidence that the alleged promises by the bank increased or diminished
the enforceable contractual rights and obligations of the borrowers to their
buyers under the contracts for deed. 10 8 While the foreclosure doubtlessly
harmed the relations between the borrowers and the buyers, the detrimental
reliance required to establish promissory estoppel was more than a mere dis-
turbance of amicable relations. 1a9
Kimsey v. Burgin 110 required the appeals court to interpret the 1987 Texas
supreme court opinion in Flag-Redfern Oil Co. v. Humble Exploration Co. I"'
The facts in Kimsey are somewhat elaborate. French, the original grantor of
the property, conveyed a sizeable ranch tract to Enterprises, retaining a ven-
dor's lien which secured the purchase money note. Enterprises subdivided
the land and sold lots by means of contracts for deed. One of the contract
purchasers, C & D, sold to Burgin, again by contract for deed. Burgin sold
to Kimsey in exchange for a note, a deed of trust, and an instrument entitled
Assignment of Agreement for Deed whereby Burgin assigned and Kimsey
assumed Burgin's rights and obligations under Burgin's contract for deed.
104. Id. at 209-10.
105. Id. at 210.
106. 812 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
107. Id. at 386.
108. Id. at 386.
109. Id. at 386-87.
110. 806 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
111. 744 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. 1987).
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Meanwhile back at the ranch, Enterprises ran into financial difficulties and
deeded its land back to French in full satisfaction of the purchase money
note. French executed a document in favor of Kimsey entitled Ratification
and Agreement, whereby French ratified the contract for deed held by Kim-
sey from Enterprises, C & D, and Burgin. When Kimsey defaulted under
his note to Burgin, Burgin foreclosed. Kimsey defended by arguing, among
other things, that the reconveyance by Enterprises to French extinguished
Burgin's interest in the land.
The court disposed of Kimsey's contentions by relying on Flag-Redfern
and pointing to French's ratification.1 12 The court did not actually discuss
Flag-Redfern, but merely quoted from it. The clear import of the quoted
portion, however, was that the deed in lieu of foreclosure from Enterprises to
French could not act to cut off the rights of subsequent purchasers such as
Burgin because, unlike a foreclosure proceeding, a deed-in-lieu transaction
presents no opportunity for such subsequent purchasers to protect their in-
terests by bidding at the foreclosure sale. In a sense, Kimsey is an extension
of the Flag-Redfern doctrine inasmuch as it affords holders of equitable title
(such as persons claiming under a contract for deed) the same protections
extended by Flag-Redfern to the holders of legal title.
Kimsey also argued that because Burgin held only equitable title, he could
not avail himself of the benefit of foreclosure proceedings. The appeals court
rejected this view by noting that the old time distinction between equitable
rights and equitable title was long ago abandoned by Texas courts, and that
the provisions in the UCC serve to make Chapter 9 of the UCC inapplicable
to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate. 13
Van Brunt v. BancTexas Quorum 114 examines a collision at the intersec-
tion of real property foreclosure law and personal property foreclosure law.
In Van Brunt a lender gave proper notice of its intent to foreclose on certain
personal property under a security agreement. When the lender determined
that the $40,000 bid at the sale was too low, however, it rejected the bid.
Without an additional notice to the debtor, it sold the collateral at a private
sale some days later, collecting $55,000 in proceeds. Later, the lender fore-
closed on a tract of land pledged by the same borrower to secure some of the
defaulted debt. When the lender sued a guarantor for the deficiency, the
guarantor contended, and the court agreed, that the lender's failure to give
notice of the private sale violated section 9.504(c) of the Texas Uniform
112. Kinsey, 806 S.W.2d at 575.
113. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(37), 9.313, 9.104(10) (Vernon 1973 and
Supp. 1989); see also Huddleston v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, 756 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
114. 804 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
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Commercial Code; 115 therefore, the lender could not sue for a deficiency. 116
The guarantor, pointing to the UCC section 9.505(b), 17 maintained that
by failing to give reasonable notice of the private sale, the lender was deemed
to have elected to retain the collateral in complete satisfaction of the debt,
and therefore could not sue for a deficiency.I The court disagreed. It
noted that under UCC section 9.501(d), a secured party with liens on both
real and personal property may proceed as to both.119 A comment to that
provision interprets the section as providing the secured party with an op-
tion to proceed separately under the UCC.120 Other jurisdictions, however,
have ruled that the UCC's default provisions (including section 9.505) are
inapplicable to real property foreclosures. 121 The majority said that because
the creditor's loss of its right to seek a deficiency is judicially imposed rather
than mandated by UCC section 9.505, and because of the UCC's intent not
to interfere with real property foreclosure law, the lender should be free to
pursue a deficiency judgment under its real property mortgage documents
notwithstanding the defective notice and consequent waiver of deficiency
rights under the UCC. 122
A well-argued dissenting opinion took issue with the majority. 123 The dis-
senter asserted that the UCC allows a secured party to proceed as to both
real and personal property in accordance with his rights and remedies under
the mortgage documents. Alternately, the UCC allows a secured party to
proceed separately against the real and personal property, whether concur-
rently or successively. Once the secured party makes the latter election, he
is then saddled with the rules of the UCC. If he loses his right to seek a
115. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Vernon 1977). That statute provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(c) ... Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or
is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of
the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after
which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent
by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale ....
116. Van Brunt, 804 S.W.2d at 121-22.
117. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.505(b). The pertinent portion of UCC Section
9.505(b) is as follows:
(b) In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collateral a se-
cured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to
the debtor if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying
his rights under this subsection .... If the secured party receives objection in
writing from a person entitled to receive notification within twenty-one days
after the notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the collateral under
Section 9.504. In the absence of such written objection the secured party may
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.
118. The preclusion of the seeking of a deficiency judgment is not required by the language
of UCC section 9.505, but rather is a judicial rule. See Wright v. InterFirst Bank Tyler, 746
S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
119. 804 S.W.2d at 124.
120. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.505(d) (Vernon 1977).
121. 804 S.W.2d at 124-25.
122. Id. at 122.
123. Id. at 123-26.
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deficiency judgment because of a faulty procedure under the UCC, then the
act of foreclosing on a mortgage is not sufficient to revive the right.
Shields v. Atlantic Financial Mortgage Corporation 124 arose out of a defi-
ciency action where the mortgagor defended by contending that the mortga-
gee's failure to pay mortgage insurance premiums violated the DTPA and
resulted in a waiver by the mortgagee of the right to collect a deficiency
judgment. In Shields the mortgagor had paid the premiums to the mortga-
gee as required by the loan documents. The court affirmed that mortgage
insurance is for the benefit of mortgagee - not the mortgagor.1 25 Moreover,
because a written contractual provision required payment of the premiums,
no misrepresentation of a warranty or guaranty could have occurred, thus
precluding any DTPA claim. Shields thus implicitly confirms what is ex-
plicit in the deficiency legislation discussed earlier - that a private mortgage
insurer has the right to proceed by way of subrogation against a foreclosed-
upon mortgagor, even where the mortgagor paid its mortgagee for the insur-
ance premiums.
Security Bank v. Dalton 126 involves borrowers who moved their banking
business to a Flower Mound bank when their long-time lending officer be-
came president of that bank. Thereafter, the bank became insolvent, the
FDIC transferred the bank's assets to a newly-created bank, and the presi-
dent was replaced. The new president assured the borrowers that it would
be business as usual as regarded their loans. To the borrowers, business as
usual evidently meant the habitual extension of the loans, notwithstanding
that they exceeded the limit of money the bank could lawfully lend to one
borrowing entity. When the loans at issue matured, however, the bank re-
fused further extensions and demanded payment. The borrowers interposed
a number of defenses, including breach of a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing and false, misleading, and deceptive acts under the DTPA. The borrow-
ers won a sizeable jury award. The appeals court overturned the portion of
the jury award based on a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Relying heav-
ily on FDIC v. Coleman, 127 the appeals court all but suggested that no such
duty could ever exist between a lender and borrower.12 8 In all events, said
the court, any special relationship between the bank or its former president
ended when the FDIC stepped in, transferred the assets, and fired the former
president.
A borrower hardly needs a duty of good faith in its arsenal, however,
when it has at its disposal the DTPA. The appeals court found that the
borrowers were "consumers", thus making the DTPA applicable to the loan
transactions, because the bank knew that the loan proceeds were to be used
124. 799 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App-El Paso 1990, no writ).
125. Id. at 444.
126. 803 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
127. 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
128. Id. at 453 (see the dubious case of Knight v. Int'l. Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d
382 (Tex. 1982) (because the bank knew that the borrower intended to use the loan proceeds to
purchase a dump truck, the borrower was a consumer under the DTPA)).
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for purchasing goods.129 The evidence in the record that it would be busi-
ness as usual was thus sufficient to support the DTPA damages awarded by
the jury.
The bank presented D'Oench, Duhme 130 and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) de-
fenses, but these were rejected out of hand by the court because, it said, the
borrowers' cause of action was predicated upon enforcement of affirmative
misrepresentations rather than any alleged secret agreement.' 3' The bor-
rowers can count their lucky stars that they were in state rather than federal
court. 1
32
Deposit Insurance Company Bridge Bank v. McQueen 133 confirmed, in a
detailed fashion, that (i) a foreclosure notice mailed to one spouse at a place
where they reside as husband and wife is effective as to both spouses and
(ii) the recitals in a trustee deed are prima facie evidence of the validity of
the foreclosure sale, including evidence of service of timely notice on the
debtor. 134 The deed of trust at issue provided that the recitals in any
trustee's deed would be prima facie evidence of the truth of such facts. It
appears from the case, that even if the deed of trust had not had such a
provision, the law would imply one.
Finally, Bryant v. Texas American Bank/Levelland135 confirmed again
that in counting the 21 days that are required by section 51.0002(b) of the
Texas Property Code between the notice of foreclosure sale and the sale it-
self, one excludes the day of sale and includes the day of notice.' 36
II. LANDLORD & TENANT
A. Damages
The death of an apartment visitor by smoke inhalation following a fire on
premises where no smoke detector was provided presented some novel ques-
tions in Garza- Vale v. Kwiecien. 137 The deceased's parents filed a wrongful
death action and recovered damages on a common law negligence theory.
The judgment was reversed on appeal, however, with the appellate court
applying the provisions of the Texas Property Code dealing with residential
tenancies. 38 The court commenced by noting that at common law a land-
lord does not owe a duty to repair leased premises and thus is not liable for
personal injury to a tenant or his guests resulting from dangerous existing
conditions.139 The court noted that the common law rule was abrogated to
129. 803 S.W.2d at 451-52.
130. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), reh'g. denied, 315 U.S. 830
(1942).
131. Security Bank, 803 S.W.2d at 453.
132. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987) (claimed oral misrepresentations may not
vary a borrower's loan obligation).
133. 804 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
134. See Houston First American Say. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1983).
135. 795 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ granted).
136. Id. at 916.
137. 796 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
138. Id. at 503 (applying TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ch. 92 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1992).
139. 796 S.W.2d at 502.
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the extent of the implied warranty of habitability for residential leases
adopted in the seminal Texas case of Kamarath v. Bennett.14° The holding
in Kamarath in turn, was itself abrogated by legislative enactments. 14 1 The
court went on to note that although there was no Texas case in point, other
jurisdictions have found that there is no common law duty to provide smoke
detectors. 142
The court then turned to claims that the landlord had failed to repair a
defective furnace flue and found no liability because the tenant did not notify
the landlord of the condition as required by section 92.052(a) of the Texas
Property Code. 143 This section imposes a duty upon a landlord to repair or
remedy a defective condition, provided the tenant has given notice of the
condition to the landlord, the tenant is not delinquent in rent, and the condi-
tion materially affects the physical health or safety of an ordinary tenant. 144
Turning next to the lack of a smoke detector, the court held the field was
preempted by the Texas Smoke Detectors Statute, 145 the liability provisions
of which specifically require that a tenant request installation or repair of a
smoke detector and that written notice be given if the landlord fails to com-
ply with the request. 146 Since a request was not made pursuant to the stat-
ute, the condition precedent to liability under the remedial provisions had
not been satisfied and recovery was not available. 147 The court further
found that there was no basis for supporting the trial court's judgment on a
negligence theory as another provision of the Texas Smoke Detectors Statute
specifically provides that the duties of the landlord, and the tenant's reme-
dies thereunder, are in lieu of the common law.' 4 8 Finally, the court re-
jected a two-pronged due process constitutional challenge to the Texas
Smoke Detectors Statute, finding that the statute bore a reasonable relation
to proper legislative purpose and did not arbitrarily restrict a tenant from
court access inasmuch as no cause of action for failure to install a smoke
detector exists at common law. 14 9
Breach of the implied warranty of habitability was again the focus of a
dispute but was alleged in a different context. In Bolin Development Corp. v.
Indart a residential tenant's right to recover for property damage for breach
of an implied warranty of habitability was asserted.150 Following a fire in a
rental residence, the tenant brought suit for recovery of property damage
140. 568 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978).
141. Garza-Vale, 796 S.W.2d at 502 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (Vernon
1984)).
142. 796 S.W.2d at 503.
143. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052(a) (Vernon 1984)).
144. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052(a) (Vernon 1984).
145. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.251-.262 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1992).
146. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.259(a)(1) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1992) (requiring tenant
to request a smoke detector) and § 92.259(a)(2) (requiring a tenant to give written notice to be
landlord).
147. 796 S.W.2d at 504.
148. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.252(a) (Vernon 1984)).
149. 796 S.W.2d at 505-06.
150. 803 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991), writ denied with per curiam
opinion, 814 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1991).
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alleging negligence and breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The
jury found that negligence was not the proximate cause of the damage, but
awarded damages to the tenant, presumably based upon breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability. 15 1 The appellate court noted that an implied
warranty of habitability in residential tenancies had been established by the
supreme court in Kamarath v. Bennett,152 but that the Kamarath warranty
had been legislatively superseded by chapter 92 of the Texas Property
Code. 153 The court referred to those cases holding that damages for per-
sonal injury are not recoverable under the Kamarath implied warranty, 154
and held that providing a remedy for property damages would be contrary
to those cases holding the warranty was abrogated by statute and would
create inconsistent remedies for tenants seeking property damages, as op-
posed to those seeking damages for personal injury. 155 A dissenting judge
would have upheld the jury's verdict based upon the duty imposed upon a
landlord in tort to repair a defect after notice of the defective condition.' 5 6
The Texas supreme court, in denying an application for writ of error in the
case, specifically noted that it was not approving or disapproving the appel-
late court's discussion of actual damages under chapter 92 of the Texas
Property Code. 157
Old lease concepts and new lease issues were joined in HTM Restaurants,
Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 158 a case involving mortgage and lease prior-
ity and claims concerning asbestos containing materials. Following a loan
default by a building owner, the foreclosure of liens by his mortgagee, and
termination of a tenant's lease because it was subordinate to the mortgage,
the tenant sued the building owner with whom it had negotiated, a subse-
quent building owner, and that building owner's managing agent for fraud,
fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and non-disclosure of
the existence of asbestos in the building. The appellate court affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of the owners and manager, first dealing with the
tenant's assertion that the covenant of quiet enjoyment had been
breached. 159 The court agreed that in every lease there is an implied cove-
nant that the tenant shall have quiet and peaceful enjoyment of its prem-
ises. 160 The covenant in this case, however, was squelched by the specific
provisions of the lease that made it subject to any deeds of trust, security
interests, or mortgages which might then or thereafter encumber the build-
151. Id. at 818.
152. Kamarath, 568 S.W.2d at 660-61.
153. 803 S.W.2d at 819 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.061 (Vernon 1984 & Supp.
1991)).
154. Id. at 820 (citing Porter v. Lumbermen's Inv. Corp., 606 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, no writ) and Morris v. Kaylor Eng'g Co., 565 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
155. 803 S.W.2d at 820.
156. Id. at 821 (citing Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. 1962)).
157. Indart v. Bolin, 814 S.W.2d 150, 950 (Tex. 1991).
158. 797 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).




ing.' 6' Turning next to some rather disjointed arguments made by the ten-
ant concerning the existence of asbestos in the building, the court first noted
that the party who had originally negotiated the lease asserted he had no
personal knowledge that the building contained asbestos. 162 Since those as-
sertions were unopposed by the tenant, the court found there could be no
basis for fraudulent concealment. 163 The claim of negligent misrepresenta-
tion was similarly dealt with since the tenant had admitted in interrogatories
that the original owner had made no representations regarding the presence
of asbestos, thereby defeating an essential element of the misrepresentation
claim. 164 Finally, turning to another version of the concealment allegation,
the court found that there was no duty on the part of the owner to disclose
the existence of a mortgage that had affected the property for some five years
prior to execution of the lease, the tenant having had ample opportunity to
make its own investigation as to the state of title. 165
Breach of an implied warranty was again reviewed by a Texas court dur-
ing the survey period. In Kerrville HRH, Inc. v. City of Kerrville the court
reviewed the applicability of the doctrine of contributory negligence in a suit
for breach of the implied warranty of suitability. 166 The implied warranty of
suitability was first established by the Texas supreme court in Davidow v.
Inwood North Professional Group - Phase 1.167 Kerrville involved a variety of
claims including fraud and DTPA assertions. The determinations relevant
to Texas landlord and tenant law, however, were the court's statements con-
cerning the implied warranty in a commercial lease that the premises are
suitable for their intended commercial purpose.168 The tenant had leased a
farm from a city for the purpose of running a wholesale nursery business,
based upon the city's statements concerning the effectiveness of an irrigation
system servicing the farm. The tenant later learned that the irrigation sys-
tem did not work. In upholding a damage claim in favor of the tenant, the
appellate court held that a landlord can be subject to common law damages
based upon breach of an implied warranty, and while not specifically holding
that there was a breach of implied warranty, nonetheless went on to discuss
the case as if such a finding had been made. 169 The trial court had reduced
the damage award in favor of the tenant by 49% based on a jury finding that
the tenant was contributorily negligent in failing to make a proper inspection
of the premises. 170 On appeal, the court reversed this point, finding that the
Davidow implied warranty covers latent defects and that "[a] tenant, even
one who inspects the premises prior to leasing ... is under no obligation to
discover each latent defect that would render the premises unsuitable for his
161. Id.
162. Id. at 329.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 330.
165. Id. at 329.
166. 803 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
167. 747 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988).
168. Id. at 385 (citing Davidow, 747 S.W.2d at 377).
169. Id. at 385-86.
170. Id. at 380.
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purposes at the risk of being found contributorily negligent." 171 Thus, con-
tributory negligence could not defeat the cause of action for breach of the
implied warranty.' 72 It is difficult to ascertain the exact effect of this case
since the damage award in favor of the tenant could also have been based
upon fraud findings as well as breach of an implied warranty, and the state-
ments concerning contributory negligence may be dicta, although the rea-
soning seems sound.
B. Priority
Consider the following situation: on day one, landlord and tenant enter
into a lease and tenant occupies space in a shopping center; on day two, a
bank loans money to landlord and the shopping center is mortgaged as se-
curity; on day three, the lease is amended to extend the term, extinguish a
renewal right, and provide for cash payments from landlord to tenant to
enable the tenant to renovate the premises; on day four, landlord defaults on
the mortgage, bank forecloses its liens and takes possession of the premises,
and demands and accepts rent from the tenant; and on day five, tenant de-
mands the landlord's cash payment from the bank - result? In Ontiveros v.
MBank Houston 173 the court found in favor of the tenant and entered judg-
ment against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver for the
then-failed bank for the defaulted payment plus interest and attorneys
fees. 174 The court in reaching this result relied on long-settled Texas real
property law establishing the priority of the tenant's rights in the property
by occupancy and held that the foreclosure of a subsequent lien could not
affect those rights.175 The court noted that the burden is on a subsequent
mortgagee to protect itself by inquiring into the terms of existing leases and
reaching suitable agreements with its mortgagor to protect its interests. 176
The tenant had moved out of the leased premises following the bank's failure
to make the payment. The court held that the bank's failure prevented the
tenant from completing a renovation necessary to the tenant's occupancy,
which constituted an eviction allowing the tenant to abandon the property as
established in Davidow v. Inwood North Professional Group. 177
III. BROKERS
In Kubinsky v. Van Zandt Realtors 178 the Fort Worth court of appeals
refused to impose a duty on a listing agent to inspect the seller's property
and refused to create an implied warranty under the Texas Deceptive Trade
171. Id. at 386.
172. Id.
173. 751 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
174. Id. at 131.
175. Id. (citing F. Groos & Co. v. Chittim, 100 S.W. 1006, 1010 (Tex. Civ. App.-1907, no
writ)).
176. Id. at 130-31 (citing Collum v. Sanger Bros., 82 S.W. 459, 460 (Tex. 1904)).
177. Id. at 131 (citing Davidow, 747 S.W.2d 373).
178. 811 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
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Practices - Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) 179 that services involving the
exercise of professional judgment will be performed in a good and workman-
like manner. 1 8 0 Shortly after purchasing their house, the purchasers noticed
cracks in the walls, around the windows, and in the foundation. Upon fur-
ther inquiry, they discovered that foundation work had been performed
three months before they purchased their home. As is wont to happen in
such situations, the purchasers sued everybody involved in the transaction,
including the listing agent for the house, even though they had hired an
inspector to inspect the property, whose report noted minor foundation
movement. The trial court granted the agent's motion for summary judg-
ment and severed the cause of action against the agent from the actions
against the other defendants.1 8 1 On appeal, the purchasers claimed the trial
court improperly granted the agent's motion for summary judgment because
there were genuine issues as to material facts regarding whether the agent
breached her duty to inspect the property and inform the purchasers of ma-
terial facts that such an inspection would reveal and whether the agent
breached an implied warranty under the DTPA that her services would be
performed in a good and workmanlike manner. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's decision. 18 2
Section 15(a)(6)(A) of the Real Estate Licensing Act authorizes a tempo-
rary or permanent renouncement revocation of a license if an agent makes a
material misrepresentation or fails to advise a potential purchaser of any
unmanifested structural defect or any other defect known to the agent.1 8 3
This section, the court noted, does not impose a duty on the agent to inspect
the listed property or to make an affirmative investigation for possible de-
fects; it merely requires the agent to disclose defects of which it has knowl-
edge.1 8 4 Further, the Real Estate License Act makes it unlawful for a
person to act as a real estate inspector unless he has received a license to do
so,1 8 5 and prohibits one from acting as an inspector and broker for the same
transaction.1 8 6 The only duty that the agent of the seller owes to the pur-
chaser is to treat him fairly.' 8 7 This duty, the court held, is adequately ful-
filled by requiring disclosure of latent structural defects or other defects
known to the agent. 188 Because the court found the Real Estate License Act
did not impose a duty on the agent to inspect the property, the court refused
to follow a California case cited by the purchaser to support the imposition
of a duty to inspect on the listing agent;189 such additional liability, the court
179. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
180. 811 S.W.2d at 715-16.
181. Id. at 713.
182. Id.
183. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 15(a)(6)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
184. 811 S.W.2d at 714. There was evidence the sellers did not notify the agent of the
foundation problems. Id. at 716.
185. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 18C(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
186. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 18C(i)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
187. Tex. Real Estate Comm'n, 22 (West January 1, 1976) TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 531.1
(Canons of Professional Ethics and Conduct for Real Estate Licenses).
188. Kubinsky, 811 S.W.2d at 715.
189. Id. at 715. The purchaser cited Easton v. Stassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. App.
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said, should be left to the Texas legislature.1 90
Finally, the court refused to recognize an implied warranty that services
involving the exercise of professional judgment will be performed in a good
and workmanlike manner.' 9 1 Because the Texas supreme court expressly
left open the question whether such an implied warranty existed under the
DTPA 192, the court was compelled to follow Dennis V Allison, 193 which
indicated that no such implied warranty exists. 194
IV. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Statutory Condemnation
City of Houston v. Religious of the Sacred Heart of Texas 195 arose out of
the celebrated condemnation of a portion of the Duchesne campus for the
extension of Chimney Rock Road. The condemnation severed about two
acres of the 15-acre campus, and the school appealed from the commission-
ers' award of $7,250,000. At trial, the school urged that the so-called substi-
tute facilities doctrine provided the correct means of assessing damages.
Under the doctrine, a landowner is entitled to additional compensation over
and above market value to allow for the replacement of the condemned facil-
ity. 196 Based on the substitute facilities doctrine, the trial court awarded
damages of $18,451,398.
On appeal, the city challenged the vitality of the substitute facilities doc-
trine, contending that the applicable standard should be the customary fair
market value standard. The appeals court noted that only two Texas appel-
late cases discussed the substitute facilities doctrine, 197 and that the doctrine
has, since it was first announced, fallen into disrepute with the U.S. Supreme
Court.198 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's revised analysis, the appeals
court said that the subjective elements inherent in the substitute facilities
doctrine enhance the risks of error and prejudice, and diverge from the prin-
ciple that just compensation is to be measured by an objective standard.
While the doctrine might be applicable to some public facilities that cannot
readily be bought on the market such as streets and sewage treatment plants,
1st Dist. 1984) in which the California court imposed a duty on the listing agent to inspect the
listed property and to disclose to the prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the
value of the property that such an investigation would reveal.
190. 811 S.W.2d at 715.
191. Id.
192. Id. In Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987), the Texas
supreme court held that there exists an implied warranty to repair or modify existing tangible
goods or property in a good and workmanlike manner under § 17.50(a)(2) of the DTPA.
193. 698 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1985).
194. Kubinsky, 811 S.W.2d at 715.
195. 811 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
196. Id. at 737. The doctrine arose from dictum in Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78
(1923).
197. City of Houston, 811 S.W.2d at 737 (citing State v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 364
S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of San Antonio v. Congrega-
tion of Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, Inc., 404 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1966, no writ)).
198. Id. at 737 (citing United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
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it should not be used where there is evidence of fair market value for the
property involved.1 99
The court noted that the jury based its verdict on testimony that it would
cost the school approximately $18-million to acquire and build on adjacent
property. The court observed, however, that acquisition of the adjacent
property would give the school approximately six acres more land than it
owned before the condemnation. Further, the court said the trial verdict
amounted to a windfall to the school, which had no obligation to purchase
the adjoining property or even to operate the school at that or any other
location. 2° ° Accordingly, the appeals court remanded for a new damage de-
termination in accordance with the customary fair market value
measurement.
State v. Windham 20 1 involved the intriguing question of whether the
courts or the legislature are the proper arbiters of the Texas Constitution.
Windham arose after the state condemned a two-acre strip out of a 19-acre
tract for the widening of a state highway. The landowner designated an
approximately 4-acre tract as a commercial development unit, waived dam-
ages as to the remainder of the land, and contended that the per acre value of
the 4-acre unit was much larger than the average per acre value of the entire
tract. The trial court permitted the unit designation and the waiver with
regard to the remainder of the land. On appeal, the state contended that the
landowner's action violated a 1984 statute which mandates that any increase
in the value of adjoining land shall also be taken into account in determining
a condemnation award. 20 2 The appeals court agreed, but declined to follow
the statute. The appeals court said that the statute directly contravenes the
Texas supreme court's interpretation of article I, section 17 of the Texas
Constitution; that interpretation provides that adequate compensation is to
be determined without reference to the benefits that a landowner might de-
rive from the improvement to be made by the condemnor. 20 3 The appeals
court said it was not bound to give effect to the 1984 statute, because the
high court had never held the statute constitutional, nor had the constitution
been amended to comport with the statute.2°4
Mellon v. Southern Pacific Transport Co. 20 5 considered the special nature
of railroad easements. In Mellon a fee owner challenged the right of a rail-
road to whom he had granted an easement to, in turn, grant another ease-
ment to a communications company for a fiber optic cable to be buried
approximately three feet beneath the railroad right-of-way. The federal trial
court held for the railroad on two separate grounds. First, it said that under
199. Id. at 737-38.
200. Id. at 738.
201. 803 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ granted).
202. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.042(e) (Vernon 1984).
203. Windham, 803 S.W.2d at 341 (citing Buffalo Bayou, Brazos & Colo. R.R. Co. v. Fer-
ris, 26 Tex. 588 (1863)).
204. Id. at 341-42 (relying on State v. Enterprise Co., 728 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. Id. at 253 (citing Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1975).
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the so-called incidental use doctrine, a railroad is free to permit others to
occupy its right of way in a manner that it considers best fitted to promote
the public use. 2 ° 6 This doctrine has vitality not only under federal law, but
also under Texas law; indeed, while a railroad cannot make use of the min-
eral estate in its right-of-way, it can authorize uses of the remainder of the
right-of-way.20 7 Second, the court noted that even if the railroad did not
have power to grant the easement to the communications company, the
communications company, as a legislatively preferred class of utility, would
have the power to condemn the privately owned property under Texas
law.20 In response to the owner's argument that Texas law is more restric-
tive than federal law on the rights of railroads and telecommunications com-
panies, the court held that, to the extent that federal and state law are
divergent, the former preempts the latter.209
The crucial issue in Hooks v. Fourth Court ofAppeals210 was the moment
at which a condemnor losses its right to dismiss a condemnation proceeding.
Hooks, decided by the Texas supreme court, arose out of the All American
Pipeline project which has given rise to a healthy amount of condemnation
litigation during the past several years. The pipeline company filed its con-
demnation action in 1986, after surveying the condemnee's property and, in
the process, cutting down 23 trees along the proposed right-of-way. A
month later, the pipeline company deposited approximately $56,000 in the
trial court's registry based on the commissioners' award. The landowner
withdrew a portion of the award to construct an access road for the part of
his ranch that would be cut off by the proposed easement. Thereafter, sev-
eral years of federal court litigation ensued over whether the pipeline com-
pany had properly complied with environmental impact statement
requirements. The pipeline company agreed to relocate the large portion of
its proposed right-of-way as a consequence of that litigation. Because the
relocation bypassed the condemnee's property, the pipeline company sought
to dismiss its condemnation proceeding and to recover the amounts it had
deposited into the court's registry, less the condemnee's reasonable attor-
neys' fees. When the trial court refused to dismiss the matter, the pipeline
company sought mandamus relief, contending that its motion to dismiss
was, in essence, a motion for non-suit, to which it was entitled as a matter of
absolute right. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus, resulting in
the condemnor's appeal to the state's high court.
The Texas supreme court noted that, in ordinary cases, the plaintiff had
an absolute right to take a non-suit. The rule in condemnation cases is, how-
ever, more restrictive. Once a condemnor has taken possession of the prop-
206. Id. at 229-30 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R., 195 U.S. 540, 570 (1904)).
207. Id. at 230 (citing Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. Mo. K.T.R.R., 476 S.W.2d 732, 739 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
208. Id. at 231 (referring to TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1416 (Vernon 1980); City of
Brownwood v. Brown Tel. & Tel. Co., 106 Tex. 114, 157 S.W. 1163 (1913).
209. Windham, 803 S.W.2d 232-33 (citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 10749 (West Supp. 1989)); Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Tex., 833 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1987).
210. 808 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1991).
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erty, dismissal is allowed only if no prejudice or harm to the landowner
would result.21 1 While the pipeline company had not taken actual posses-
sion of the easement it originally sought, it was clear that the deposit of the
commissioners' award into the court's registry constituted constructive pos-
session. The issue, therefore, was whether the landowner had been
prejudiced or harmed as a result of the constructive possession. That issue,
said the high court, should be tried by the trial court and reviewed by the
court of appeals subject to the ordinary appeals process. 21 2
All American Pipeline Co. v. Ammerman213 another case arising out of the
transcontinental pipeline, is notable because it indicates that a trial court
may properly consider the prospective fear that would be engendered in the
minds of the buying public by the condemnor's activities. In Ammerman the
commissioners had awarded $11,760 in damages for a 2.23-acre permanent
easement across a 140-acre tract. On appeal to the trial court, the landown-
ers presented evidence that the pipeline would run within 90 feet of the resi-
dential improvements on the ranch property, and that potential buyers
would find the property far less valuable for that reason. Based on this evi-
dence, the trial court awarded the condemnee approximately $75,000 in
damages. The appeals court disagreed with the pipeline company's conten-
tion that the landowner's witnesses failed to offer any reasonable information
concerning the general public's fear of being in close proximity to a crude oil
pipeline, and affirmed the trial court's award.2 14 The appeals court noted
that a Bureau of Land Management decision, admitted into evidence, indi-
cated that 27 oil spills could be expected along the pipeline from California
to the Gulf Coast, and said this type of evidence shows either an actual
danger that forms the basis of fear or the type of fear which is reasonable. 215
B. Inverse Condemnation
Five cases from this Survey period illustrate the difficulties of proving an
inverse condemnation case.
In State v. Westgate, Ltd.216 a shopping center owner sought to prove that
a city's alleged undue delay in instituting condemnation proceedings resulted
in extra damages, compensable by an inverse condemnation proceeding. In
reversing the trial court's award of such extra damages, the appeals court
noted that a landowner complaining of inverse condemnation must show a
material and substantial interference with access to its property.2 17 To do
this, the landowner must prove either "(1) a total but temporary restriction
of access; (2) a partial but permanent restriction of access; or (3) a tempo-
rary limited restriction of access brought about by an illegal activity or one
211. Id. at 60 (citing Murray v. Devco, Ltd., 731 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1987)).
212. Id. at 61.
213. 814 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, n.w.h.).
214. 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
215. Id. at 252-53 (distinguishing Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. v. Zirjacks, 244
S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, writ dism'd)).
216. 798 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ granted).
217. Id. at 906.
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that is negligently performed or unduly delayed. ' 218 The appeals court said
that although the landowner was proceeding under the third category, it
never pleaded or proved a temporary limited restriction of access; indeed,
the landowner conceded that the city did not interfere with or physically
block access to the subject property.219
In City of El Paso v. Madero Development 220 a landowner sought damages
after the city rezoned approximately 34-acres for planned mountain develop-
ment, which the landowner claimed would reduce the tract's potential
number of residential lots from 150 to 11. The city appealed a trial court
award of $871,200, urging that the ripeness doctrine precluded any determi-
nation of the matter since the landowner had not applied for a variance to
the new zoning.221 The appeals court noted that under the ripeness doctrine
an essential prerequisite to a takings claim is a final authoritative determina-
tion regarding the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the
subject property.222 Here, the landowner had failed to seek a variance,
hence no final determination had occurred. The landowner countered by
arguing the so-called futility doctrine made his case an appropriate exception
to the ripeness requirement. 223 That is, because the zoning authority had no
authority to make variances not in keeping with the intent of the rezoning,
any requests for such a variance would be futile. The court declined to apply
the futility doctrine, noting that while the zoning authority might not have
authority to allow 150 building lots, it might be authorized to allow more
than 11.224 A dissenting opinion agreed with the majority's analysis under
the ripeness doctrine, but noted that the city had failed to file a plea in abate-
ment, and said that the ripeness doctrine was therefore waived. 225
In Hues v. Warren Petroleum Co. 226 the property owners asserted that gas
leaks from an oil company's plant amounted to an inverse condemnation.
Consequently, they brought their suit within the condemnation law's 10-year
statute of limitations rather than the 2-year statute that would apply to an
ordinary damage claim. The appeals court agreed with the oil company's
claim that it had no eminent domain powers under Texas statutes. Further,
it said that the decrease in the property owner's fair market values was in the
nature of damaged property rather than the actual physical appropriation of
the property or an unreasonable interference with the owner's use and enjoy-
ment of the property.227
218. Id. (citing City of Austin v. Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1986).
219. Id. at 906-07.
220. 803 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
221. Id. at 398-99.
222. Id. at 400 (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348
(1986)).
223. Id. (citing MacDonald, 477 U.S. 340).
224. Id. at 400-01.
225. Id. at 401-02 (Osborn, J., concurring and dissenting).
226. 814 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
227. Id. (citing Allen v. City of Texas City, 775 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1989, writ denied)).
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At issue in City of Grapevine v. Grapevine Pool Road Joint Venture228 was
whether the city's barricading of a road constituted a damaging or taking
under the Texas Constitution. Reviewing an award of damages by the trial
court, the appeals court stated that, as a matter of law, a property owner's
right of access is not materially and substantially impaired if the access re-
striction merely results in a diversion of traffic or circuity of travel. 229 Here,
although one public street was barricaded, another public street continued to
furnish access to the subject property along 162 feet of frontage. Hence, no
condemnation award was proper. 230 The appeals court distinguished DuPuy
v. City of Waco 231 as a case in which the property owner was left with access
only from an alleyway rather than a public street. 232
Finally, in City of Carrollton v. OHBA Corp.233 a landowner obtained a
declaration by the trial court that a city ordinance was unconstitutional.
The ordinance prohibited the issuance of a construction permit on any prop-
erty subject to a city-initiated condemnation proceeding unless the proposed
construction reflected the post-condemnation condition of the property. The
appeals court reversed, holding that because the condemnation proceeding
was strictly administrative, and because the condemnee had not invoked the
trial court's legal jurisdiction by filing objections to the commissioners'
award, the third court lacked jurisdiction to grant the declaratory relief.234
V. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING
If one dedicates property to a municipality, has he conveyed fee simple
title to the municipality? Not necessarily so. In Russell v. City of Bryan ,235
Tyler Haswell delivered a deed to the City of Bryan for approximately ten
acres of land to be maintained as a park in honor of his mother. The deed
recited that the land was dedicated to the City, provided that certain condi-
tions were satisfied; the deed did not contain the words grant, sell, or convey.
More than sixty years later, the heirs of Haswell sought a declaratory judg-
ment regarding the interests of the City of Bryan and North Central Oil
Corporation in the park. The heirs claimed that Haswell conveyed an ease-
ment for the surface use of the land only, while the City and the oil company
contended that Haswell conveyed fee simple title to the land, with a right of
reentry and reversion for failure of specified conditions. The trial court
granted the City's and oil company's motions for summary judgment.236
The appellate court, however, held that summary judgment was improperly
granted because the deed used the word dedicate and did not use any of the
228. 804 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
229. Id. at 677-78 (citing State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.
1988)).
230. Id. at 678 (distinguishing DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1965).
231. 396 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1965).
232. City of Grapevine, 804 S.W.2d at 678.
233. 809 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
234. Id. at 589 (citing Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1984)).
235. 797 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
236. Id. at 115.
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typical words of conveyance (i.e., grant, sell, or convey). 237 The court noted
that dedicate means an appropriation of one's property to some public use; it
is not a synonym for the words grant, sell or convey. 23 Accordingly, it
could not be ascertained from the deed whether Haswell intended to convey
fee simple title to, or an easement across, the land. Thus, summary judg-
ment was inappropriate because a factual issue existed regarding Haswell's
intent when he delivered the deed to the City.239
Riley v. Campeau Homes (Texas), Inc.240 involves the proper interpreta-
tion of a right of first refusal. The tenant leased a condominium unit under a
lease which granted the tenant the right to purchase the unit if it were of-
fered for sale to a third party. The landlord delivered notice to the tenant
that it intended to sell the tenant's unit in a bulk sale for a specified purchase
price. The tenant timely notified the landlord that it intended to exercise its
right of first refusal. The landlord responded that the unit in question was
part of a bulk sale and would be sold only as part of the bulk sale; further, if
the tenant did not waive its right of first refusal as to the bulk sale, then the
landlord would seek to exclude the unit from the sale. Undaunted, the ten-
ant demanded its right of first refusal be honored and tendered the $5,000
earnest money deposit required under the contract. The landlord refused to
recognize the tenant's right of first refusal and advised the tenant that its
unit was being withdrawn from the proposed sale- The tenant filed suit seek-
ing damages for breach of contract and specific performance. The trial
court, relying on case law from other jurisdictions and reasoning that the
tenant would receive an unanticipated profit if allowed to purchase the con-
dominium at the per-unit-bulk-sale price, granted the landlord's motion for
partial summary judgment ruling that the right of first refusal was unen-
forceable as to this sale.241
The appellate court, however, reversed the summary judgment, refusing
to rewrite the contract of the parties.242 Once the landlord elected to sell the
unit, it became obligated to offer the unit to the tenant on the terms offered
to the third party.243 The failure of the landlord to offer to sell the unit to
the tenant was a breach of contract for which the remedy of specific per-
formance was available. 24" The lease did not exclude bulk sales from the




240. 808 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd by agr.)
241. Id. at 187.
242. Id. at 189.
243. Id. at 187.
244. Id. at 188.
245. The lease provided that if the
"Landlord should receive a bona fide offer from any person ... to purchase in
whole or in part, the Leased Premises, the Landlord shall send Tenant a copy of
the proposed Contract and notify Tenant of its intentions to accept the same.
Tenant shall have the right... to accept the terms of the Contract in writing...




clusion.246 In so doing, the court acknowledged its duty to give effect to the
intention of the parties when construing a contract; however, the intention
expressed in the contract must be honored and not the intention which the
parties may have had, but failed to express. 247
VI. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Last year's Survey article included an extensive description of the appeals
court decision in Evans v. Pollock.248 The decision was remarkable for its
thorough review of some root and branch principles of restrictive covenants.
Among those principles was the rule that, for an implied reciprocal negative
easement to arise, the development plan must originate with the common
owner and apply to the entire tract on which the restrictions are sought to be
enforced.249
This year, relying on logical extensions of Texas decisions,250 as well as
decisions from Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, and Vir-
ginia, the Texas supreme court reversed the holding below.251 In so doing,
the high court disposed of the requirement that an entire tract must be re-
stricted in order for the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements to
apply.252 Two long-standing rules, that extreme caution is to be used in
imposing reciprocal negative easements 253 and that evidence of the general
development plan must be clear and unmistakable, 254 are also of dubious
vitality in light of the high court's opinion. The sole dissenter, Justice Gon-
zalez, pointed to the reasons stated in the appeals court decision as the basis
for his dissent.25
VII. HOMESTEAD
In First Huntsville Properties Co. v. Laster 256 a divorce decree granted to
Id. at 186.
246. Id. at 189.
247. Id.
248. 793 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd, 796 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1990) (the case
is discussed in Lawrence J. Fossi, et al., Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw.
L.J. 595, 634-635 (1991), to which the reader is referred for the complex facts.)
249. Evans, 793 S.W.2d at 19.
250. The rather distinguishable decisions included Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40 (1922);
Lehmann v. Wallace, 510 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Cambridge Shores Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Spring Valley Lodge Co., 422 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); Cannon v. Ferguson, 190 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1945, no writ); Bethea v. Lockhart, 127 S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1939, writ ref'd); and Hooper v. Lottman, 171 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1914, no writ). The high court never seriously grappled with the expressly contrary holding of
Saccomanno v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), on
which the appeals court relied.
251. Evans v. Pollock, 796 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1990).
252. Id. at 472.
253. See Saccomanno v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id.
255. Evans, 796 S.W.2d at 472 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).




Ms. Laster a 73.83% interest in the family's residence, and an exclusive right
to occupy the residence until the Lasters' child reached the age of 18 or was
no longer in school, whichever occurred first. Three years later, Mr. Laster
obtained a loan and granted to the bank a lien against his 26.17% interest in
the residence. Upon default, the bank foreclosed its lien and conveyed the
interest to First Huntsville Realty Corporation, which then conveyed it to
First Huntsville Properties Company.
Ms. Laster's exclusive right of occupancy terminated in 1988, and First
Huntsville filed suit to partition its interest from that of Ms. Laster, and
requested that the trial court order a forced sale of the residence and parti-
tion the proceeds. The trial court denied First Huntsville's request and held
the residence was not subject to a forced sale because Ms. Laster's home-
stead interest in the property was paramount to First Huntsville's rights as a
co-tenant to partition the property. 257 The appellate court disagreed, noting
that the foreclosure of the bank's lien did not affect Ms. Laster's possessory
estate, and First Huntsville, as a subsequent purchaser, took the property
subject to Ms. Laster's homestead interest for the balance of the estate cre-
ated in the divorce decree.258 The court found, however, that when the ex-
clusive right to possess the property terminated, First Huntsville and Ms.
Laster became co-tenants of the property.25 9 The homestead right of one co-
tenant may not prejudice the rights of other co-tenants, the court said, and
does not affect the co-tenants' right to partition the property or to a court-
ordered sale, even when the homestead right precedes the inception of the
co-tenancy.26 Further, the court held that such a court-ordered sale is not a
forced sale under article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution.2 61 The
court construed the phrase forced sale to be limited to the sale of property
for the payment of a debt.2 62
The holding in Laster was a victory for First Huntsville, as the Texas
supreme court affirmed the decision and rejected the following points raised
by Ms. Laster: (a) the appellate court's failure to hold that Ms. Laster's
homestead interest in the residence was paramount to the right of a co-ten-
ant where the inception of a co-tenancy came after the homestead exemption
sale was affixed to the property; and (b) the appellate court's failure to hold
that article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution protects homestead
property from a forced sale by writ of partition where the undivided interest
was obtained by a creditor of another by non-judicial foreclosure upon de-




260. Id. at 153.
261. Id. (construing TEX. CONST. of 1869, Art. 16, § 50 (1973), which provides as follows:
"The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from
forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof, or part of such
purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and material used in constructing im-
provements thereon, .... ")
262. Laster, 797 S.W.2d at 153.
263. Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co., 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 229 (Dec. 14, 1992).
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First Interstate Bank ofBedford v. Bland264 reinforces the rule that a bank
may not rely solely on the representations in a deed of trust regarding the
homestead status of property, but must inspect all relevant information to
determine that the representations are consistent with the actual use of the
property. Bland and another person purchased approximately 12 acres in
1979. In 1981, Bland began constructing a permanent home on the land,
and actually moved into the house in 1982, although the house was not com-
pleted. In February 1984, Bland and his co-tenant partitioned the land, with
Bland receiving the house and four acres.
In March 1984, Bland's son requested a loan from a bank and represented
he owned the four-acre tract and used it as a summer home. The bank's
officer inspected the property with Bland's son while Bland was there. Bland
testified that he agreed to guarantee his son's debt at that time, but refused to
pledge his house as collateral. The bank officer denied discussing such a
matter. Subsequently, Bland received a call telling him the documents for
his son's loan were ready. Bland, thinking he was signing documents to
guarantee his son's debt, executed a real estate note and deed of trust, which
indicated that his son and wife were the borrowers under the documents.
The deed of trust contained a representation that the property described
therein was not the homestead of the party signing the document. The loan
was subsequently renewed, and the son and his wife executed a new promis-
sory note and a new deed of trust covering the property, which Bland did
not sign. The son defaulted on his loan and the bank sought to foreclose its
liens against Bland's property.
Bland sought an injunction to prohibit the bank from foreclosing its liens
against his property. The bank defended, claiming that Bland was estopped
from claiming the homestead exemption based on the representation in the
deed of trust.265 The court rejected the bank's argument. 266 The court
found that this was not a case where the observable facts would lead one to
conclude the property in question was not a homestead or where the use of
the property was consistent with the owner's representation that the prop-
erty was not a homestead.267 Bland was the record owner of the property,
he was paying taxes on the property, he lived on the property, and the prop-
erty was the only land he owned. The bank argued the use of the property
was not inconsistent with the son's representation that he used it as a sum-
mer home and that he lived elsewhere. The court responded the son's repre-
sentations were irrelevant since he did not own the property and held Bland
was not estopped from claiming the homestead exemption. 268
In re John Taylor Company269 involved the issue of whether the business
homestead claim is lost when the owner of property leases it to a wholly-
264. 810 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
265. Id. at 285.
266. Id. at 286.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991).
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owned corporation. The Fifth Circuit reluctantly held that it is not.270 Mr.
Taylor leased property on which he conducted his business to two wholly-
owned corporations and operated the family business on the property
through the corporations. The corporations and Mr. and Mrs. Taylor filed
for bankruptcy, and the cases were consolidated and converted to liquidation
proceedings, and the trustee filed a complaint asking for authority to sell
certain property of the estate free of all liens. Mrs. Taylor claimed some of
the property was exempt as a business homestead. Both the bankruptcy
court and district court disagreed, holding that the property lost its home-
stead character when it was leased to the wholly-owned corporations, citing
several Texas cases holding the homestead character of property is lost when
it is leased to another person or entity. 271 The Fifth Circuit, however, dis-
agreed, noting that the cases cited by the lower courts to support their con-
clusion did not involve the leasing of property to a corporation wholly-
owned by a claimant who continues to conduct business thereon. 272 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that in Texas the transfer or conveyance of property
to a claimant-owned corporation terminates the business homestead exemp-
tion, but the business homestead exemption survives the leasing of the prop-
erty to such a corporation. 273
VIII. EASEMENTS & ROADS
There was a dearth of significant cases dealing with easements during the
Survey period, but in Sentell v. Williamson County2 7 4 a court was called
upon to determine whether a county had obtained a superior route to its
property so as to warrant cancellation of an easement. The county obtained
an access easement on the express condition that if it obtained a better and
more direct access route, the easement would terminate. Subsequently, the
county obtained an easement across adjacent property and, following a dis-
pute with the grantor of that easement, entered a compromise agreement
which provided for a land exchange and the acquisition of a permanent ease-
ment. This resulted in providing the county with ownership of land adjoin-
ing both sides of an interstate highway. The grantors of the first easement
then sought a declaratory judgment that the county had acquired better ac-
cess. The court held the issue was to be determined as matter of law because
the facts were not in dispute and the terms of the agreement were not ambig-
270. Id. at 76.
271. Id. at 76-77. (the following cases were cited by the lower courts: Duncan v. Woolf,
380 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e); Westergreen v. Camp-
bell, 127 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1939, no writ); Yates v. Home Building &
Loan Co., 103 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ)).
272. Id. at 77.
273. Id. (citing Inman v. Inman, 80 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, no writ)
(holding business homestead was not lost when owner leased it to a partnership in which
owner was a partner) and Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Miller, 240 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1951, no writ) (holding that a business homestead was not abandoned when owner
continued to conduct his individual business on premises along with the business of a corpora-
tion owned by him and his family)).
274. 801 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
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uous.27 5 Since the county had obtained direct access over its own property
this was, as a matter of law, a better and more direct route than one that
burdened an adjacent landowner, even if the route across the county's land
was more circuitous or more physically difficult to use. 2 76 Accordingly, the
court rendered judgement that the county's easement had terminated.277
IX. ADVERSE POSSESSION
There were three cases of relative significance dealing with adverse posses-
sion during the Survey period, two of them involving the supreme court.
Rhodes v. Cahill278 afforded the supreme court an opportunity to discuss the
requirements for establishing title by adverse possession as a matter of law.
The claimant, seeking title to five tracts of land by adverse possession, was
awarded one tract by the trial court following a non-jury trial.27 9 The court
of civil appeals reversed that holding, finding that the claimant had estab-
lished title as a matter of law as to all five tracts.280 The supreme court
noted that proving adverse possession under the applicable ten-year statute
of limitations 28 ' requires a showing of actual, visible, continuous, notorious,
distinct, hostile, and adverse possession constituting an actual and visible
appropriation of the land for ten or more consecutive years.282 Addressing
the evidence in the case, the supreme court first noted that the claimant's
assertion that cedar trees had been sold and cleared from the land was some
evidence of adverse possession, but the claimant could not verify that the
trees in question had been removed from the tracts in question, and also
noted that isolated commercial sales of cedar or selective clearing for grazing
purposes was not sufficient to show adverse possession as a matter of law
over a ten-year period.283 The parties' stipulation as to payment of taxes was
also insufficient because at most it showed that the claimant had paid taxes
on property of her own and on the tracts in dispute - while this was compe-
tent evidence of adverse possession it also was insufficient to establish the
same as a matter of law under the ten-year statute.28 4 Likewise, the grazing
of cattle and goats on the disputed tracts was insufficient since those tracts
had been included within a parcel owned by the claimant and under fence
existing at the time of acquisition. Such a fence constitutes a casual fence
and not a fence that designedly enclosed the area in question and, thus,
again, was not sufficient to establish as a matter of law the requisite adverse
possession. 285
275. Id. at 223.
276. Id. (citing Coleman v. Forister, 514 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. 1974)).
277. Sentell, 801 S.W.2d at 223-24.
278. 802 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1990).
279. Id. at 644.
280. Id.
281. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992).
282. 802 S.W.2d at 645, (citing Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166 (1884)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 646.
285. Id. (on rehearing, the court of civil appeals held that the trial court's judgment was
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McLaren v. Beard 286 also involved the supreme court in a case of adverse
possession, this time dealing with the requirements for affirmative repudia-
tion of title by a co-tenant and the necessity for a jury instruction on the
issue. The dispute arose out of a partition deed executed by two family
members. Walter's branch of the family claimed title to a part of the parti-
tioned land through adverse possession and prevailed at trial. 28 7 The other
branch of the family, Claude's branch, appealed, arguing that the trial
court's failure to give instructions on repudiation of title required reversal.
A majority of the supreme court found that the doctrine requiring an occu-
pying co-tenant to expressly notify its co-tenants not in occupancy that its
possession was notorious and adverse was limited to cases where a co-tenant
grantor remained in possession of land after execution of a deed conveying
the land to another co-tenant.288 Since in this case it was agreed that Wal-
ter's branch had not occupied the disputed tract prior to execution of the
partition deed, specific notice of repudiation was not required and, thus, the
court's failure to give the requested instruction was not reversible error.289
The court also went on to hold that where the doctrine of repudiation does
apply, the jury need not be separately instructed as to the doctrine, as the
requirement is subsumed in the general requirement that possession must be
commenced and continued under a hostile claim inconsistent with that of
another, which is covered in the statutory definition of adverse possession.29°
Justice Hightower dissented, chiding the court for ignoring the special cir-
cumstances applicable to co-tenancies, and would have held that following a
partition, a prior co-tenant's dominion would be adjudged permissive, simi-
lar to that of a grantor who remains in possession after a conveyance, and
that express notice of repudiation of title should be required before the limi-
tations periods for adverse possession would begin to run. 291
This issue of notice of repudiation of title required of a co-tenant was also
the subject of Spiller v. Woodward.292 In the case, a co-tenant had exclu-
sively occupied the co-owned property since 1917, had paid all taxes, and
had constructed improvements. The other co-tenant instituted a partition
suit and lost at trial, the court determining that the occupying co-tenant had
established title to the property by adverse possession. 293 On appeal, the
court of civil appeals reversed. 294 First, the court held that since in 1940 and
1953 the non-occupying co-tenant had joined with the occupying co-tenant
in executing easements, this indicated that the non-occupying co-tenant still
not against the great weight and preponderance of evidence. Cahill v. Lyda, 814 S.W.2d 390
(Tex. App.-Austin, 1991, no writ).
286. 811 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1991).
287. Id. at 565.
288. Id. at 568 (citing Sweeten v. Park, 276 S.W.2d 794, 797 (1955) and Kidd v. Young 190
S.W.2d 65, 66 (1945)).
289. Id. at 569.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 569-70.
292. 809 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).




asserted dominion over the property and destroyed the continuous owner-
ship claim of the occupying co-tenant.295 The court then found that the
purported conveyance of one acre of the property by the occupying co-ten-
ant was not sufficient to give constructive notice of a claim of adverse posses-
sion since the non-occupying co-tenant, being vested in title, was under no
duty to constantly examine the public records to guard against instruments
affecting its title.296 As to inferred notice, the court of appeals agreed that
where a possessory co-tenant's occupancy is "long, continuous, notorious,
exclusive, and inconsistent with the title of others," that will be sufficient to
infer notice of adverse possession. 29 7 In this case, however, the assertion of
ownership by the execution of the easements interrupted the occupier's con-
tinuity, and the court held that possession since the execution of the last
easement in 1953 was not long enough as to raise the inference of notice
necessary as between co-tenants.298 This decision is probably not inconsis-
tent with McLaren v. Beard, discussed above, as apparently the occupying
co-tenant was in occupancy of the property at the time the co-tenancy was
established. However, it does seem that this court was far less tolerant of the
adverse claim of the co-tenant than the supreme court was in McLaren.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 627.
297. Id. at 628.
298. Id. at 629.
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